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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Steven Leslie Williams (Mr. Williams) suffered a lifetime 
disqualification of his commercial driving privileges following 
his second failure of evidentiary breath testing. He was not 
operating a commercial vehicle during either of the incidents. 
This is an appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order affirming the Idaho Transportation Department's 
lifetime disqualification. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On June 12, 2010, Mr. Williams was arrested for driving 
under the influence. He failed a breath test for a second time. 
At the time of the arrest he held a Class A Commercial Driver's 
License (COL) and a Class 0 Driver's license. 
On June 17, 2010, the State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation (the Department) served Mr. Williams with a 
"Notice of Lifetime Disqualification" stating that the Department 
records indicated that Mr. Williams had committed more than one 
major offense as defined by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 49 CFR 383.51, i.e., he failed two breath tests 
after being arrested for driving under the influence on two 
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different occasions. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-
335(4) Mr. Williams' privilege to operate a commercial motor 
vehicle was disqualified for his lifetime effective July 12, 
2010. 
On July 23, 2010 a hearing was held pursuant to Mr. 
Williams' Request for an Administrative Hearing. 
On July 29, 2010 hearing examiner Michael Howell issued 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order" 
sustaining the lifetime disqualification. The preliminary order 
became final on August 13, 2010 and Mr. Williams filed a Petition 
for Judicial Review with the District Court on September 8, 2010. 
The issues were briefed by the parties and oral argument was 
heard by the District Court on May 27, 2011. 
On July 18, 2011 the District Court issued a written 
Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the Department's final 
order. 
On August 26, 2011, Mr. Williams filed this appeal with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed with 
this Court September 14, 2011. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
On June 12, 2010, Mr. Williams was arrested for driving 
under the influence. He failed evidentiary breath testing for a 
second time. The arrest occurred while Mr. Williams was driving 
a noncommercial vehicle. R. at p.7. 1 
As a result of the lifetime disqualification of his COL, Mr. 
Williams has suffered significant hardship. As a result of the 
lifetime disqualification of his COL, Mr. Williams' employment 
opportunities and ability to earn a living have also been 
significantly limited. See Affidavit of Steven Leslie Williams. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the decision of the Department made in violation of 
the procedural due process rights of Mr. Williams? 
2. Was the decision of the Department made in violation of 
Mr. Williams' rights under the 5 th and 6t~, Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution? 
On October 13, 2008 when Mr. Williams was arrested for 
driving under the influence for the first time and failed the 
breath test, he was also driving a noncommercial vehicle. 
Mr. Williams will not pursue this issue on appeal. 
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3. Was the decision of the Department made in violation of 
Mr. Williams' rights under Idaho Code § 18-8002A and the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution? 
4. Was the decision of the Department arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion and/or in excess of the 
authority of the Department because there lS no nexus between the 
violation underlying the Department's action and the action 
taken? 
5. Was the decision of the Department made in violation of 
the provisions of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article If § 6 of the Idaho Constitution 
prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment? 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISQUALIFICATION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
In 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an administrative 
license suspension under Idaho Code § 18-8002A does not violate 
double jeopardy. State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700 (1995). Two 
years after the decision in Talavera, the United States Supreme 
Court in large part disavowed the cases and analysis relied on in 
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Talavera and adopted the double jeopardy analysis In Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). 
Since the Hudson decision, the Idaho Supreme Court has not 
held whether an administrative commercial driver's license 
disqualification violates double jeopardy. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that a one year COL disqualification does not 
violate the double jeopardy clause. Buell v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 257 (Id. App. 2011). However, Idaho 
Courts have never decided whether a lifetime disqualification of 
a person's commercial driving privileges violates double 
jeopardy. 
The United States Supreme Court in Hudson ruled that the 
correct double jeopardy analysis was the analysis as outlined in 
U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mart 
Inez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In Buell, the Court of Appeals 
agreed, providing double jeopardy review for a one year COL ban 
under a Hudson analysis. 
steps: 
That analysis involves the following 
1. Determining whether the sanction is criminal or civil 
by evaluating statutory construction and both express 
and implied legislative intent; and 
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2. Where the legislature has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, a multi-factored inquiry lS 
used to determine whether the statutory scheme is so 
punitive either in purpose or effect that it 
transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty. 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002 "is devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil, 
suspension of the license of a driver" and "does not in any way 
discuss criminal offenses related to driving under the influence 
of alcohol.", State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 (1989), the Idaho 
Supreme Court has not considered whether the lifetime ban under 
Idaho Code § 49-335 fits in that category. It clearly does not 
because a 90 day or even a 1 year suspension of a driver's 
license has no similarity to the disqualification of a commercial 
driver's license for the life of the person holding that license. 
There is little legislative history on the enactment of 
Idaho Code § 49-335. What is evident however is that it was 
enacted in order to implement the provisions of 49 CFR part 
383.51, presumably in order to come into compliance with federal 
law to insure that the state did not lose federal highway 
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funding. While Buell held that disqualification under Idaho Code 
§ 49-335 was a civil sanction, that case was decided in the 
context of one year COL disqualification. It seems self-evident 
that a lifetime revocation of a person's commercial driving 
license is so punitive as to be a sanction that is criminal in 
nature. 
Citing Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez, 372 u.s. 144 (1963), 
Hudson reiterated the following list of factors to be used as 
guidelines during the second prong of the inquiry: 
1. Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint; 
2. Whether it has historically been regarded as 
punishment; 
3. Whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter; 
4. Whether its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence; 
5. Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies 
is already a crime; 
6. Whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it; and 
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7. Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation 
to the alternative purpose assigned. 
See Hudson at 99-100; Buell at 1258. 
However, "these factors must be considered in relation to 
the statute on its face" and must provide "the clearest proof" In 
order to override legislative intent and transform the sanction 
into a criminal penalty. Hudson at 100. Unlike the facts in 
Buell, the disqualification in this case is for a lifetime. A 
permanent elimination of the ability to operated a commercial 
motor vehicle is far more punitive sanction than a year long 
disqualification. 
In this case, the analysis of the Hudson factors leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that a lifetime disqualification of 
Mr. Williams' commercial driver's license is so punitive that it 
is criminal. 
A. Whether Driver's License Suspensions Have Been 
Historically Regarded as Punishment. 
This inquiry differs from determining the legislative intent 
regarding a particular sanction under the first prong of the 
analysis. Rather, sanctions can serve more than one purpose. See 
Talavera, 127 Idaho at 704 (quoting Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. 602 
(1993). Therefore, this factor requires looking beyond the 
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legislative intent to an inquiry of how this type of sanction has 
been is historically viewed. 
In Hudson, the Court stated that "revocation of a privilege 
voluntarily granted ... is characteristically free of the 
punitive criminal element." 522 U.S. at 104. The Court held that 
a banking industry debarment fell within that category. Id. 
However, such a debarment is very different from a driver's 
license suspension in Idaho. Idaho courts have recognized a 
driver's license as a right, not a mere privilege. Idaho's 
Constitution, Article If Section 1 , states as follows: 
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain 
inalienable rights, among them are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing 
safety. 
Further, due process analysis requires courts to "first 
determine whether there has been State action" and then 
"determine whether that State action deprives a person of a right 
enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Gilpin, 132 
Idaho 643, 649 (Ct. App. 1999) Therefore, in order for a state 
action to violate due process, it must violate a right of an 
individual. 
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In State v. Ankey, 109 Idaho 1 (1985), the Court found that 
because the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves State 
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensee, 
driver's licenses may not be taken away without procedural due 
process. Id. at 3. 
In a concurring opinion. Justice Shepard wrote: 
I suggest that neither of those cases provide any 
authority for the validation of a statute which 
authorizes the peremptory seizure by a field police 
officer of a valuable property right without action by 
a neutral and detached official, be it judicial or 
otherwise. 
Id. at 6. 
The Idaho Supreme Court clearly recognizes that a driver's 
license is a fundamental and valuable property right and, 
therefore, state action taking away that right is subject to due 
process constraints. Thus, because Idaho recognizes a driver's 
license as a right, the suspension of a driver's license has a 
punitive criminal element. 
Apart from 18-8002A, driver's license suspensions have long 
been a part of the punishment for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, driving without privileges, vehicular 
homicide, and minor in possession of alcohol. Therefore, based on 
the fact that a driver's license is considered a valuable 
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property right and that driver's license suspensions clearly 
serve a deterrent purpose and have been historically utilized as 
criminal punishments, a lifetime revocation of a commercial 
driver's license is criminal and violates double jeopardy. 
B. Whether the Operation of a Driver's License Suspension 
Promotes the Traditional Aims of Punishment, i.e. 
Retribution and Deterrence. 
A lifetime driver's license suspension promotes retribution 
and deterrence. While Idaho Courts have not viewed driver's 
license suspensions as punishment, the Courts have never 
considered a lifetime disqualification in their analysis. See 
Buell. As discussed above, Talavera acknowledged that 
suspensions under 18-8002A promote the traditional goals of 
punishment. 127 Idaho at 703-705. In addition, the Court stated 
that the Department has acknowledged the deterrent effect of 
license suspensions. A lifetime ban is a permanent sanction and 
clearly retributive. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 
finding a violation of double jeopardy. 
C. Whether the Behavior to Which the Driver's License 
Suspension Applies Is Already a Crime. 
The lifetime revocation is imposed when a driver has twice 
failed an evidentiary test for alcohol indicating that they were 
driving under the influence. Therefore, the behavior to which the 
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revocation applies is a crime under Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 
18-8004A, and/or 18-8004C. This factor also weighs in favor of 
finding a double jeopardy violation because the statute is 
connected to multiple criminal statutes. 
D. Whether an Alternative Purpose to Which the Suspension 
May Rationally Be Connected Is Assignable to it and 
Whether the Suspension Is Excessive in Relation to That 
Alternative Purpose. 
This discussion combines the last two factors In the Hudson 
analysis. 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court stated that it was improper to 
"assess the character of the actual sanctions imposed. ff 522 U.S. 
at 101 (quoting Kennedy V. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 
(1963)). This method of analysis is unworkable because it will 
never conclusively resolve whether a particular statutory scheme 
is punitive: 
It will not be possible to determine whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has 
proceeded through a trial to judgment. But in those 
cases where the civil proceeding follows the criminal 
proceeding, this approach flies in the face of the 
notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the 
government from even attempting a second time to punish 
criminally. 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102 (internal quotations omitted). In Seling 
v. Young, the Court reiterated that an "as applied" analysis is 
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improper because the nature of a sanction cannot be altered 
"based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the 
authorizing statute." 531 u.s. 250, 263 (2000). 
Rather, the proper method of analysis is to consider the 
second prong factors "in relation to the statute on its face" and 
not in relation to how the statute was implemented with regard to 
a specific individual. Hudson, 522 u.s. at 100. 
Therefore, in looking at whether the sanctions set forth in 
Idaho Code 49-335 are disproportionate to the remedial purpose of 
the statute, we must look at all potential suspensions provided 
for in the statute and all the possible circumstances under which 
they could be imposed. In sum, this Court must look at what the 
maximum sanction is that can be imposed, i.e., a lifetime 
disqualification as happened in this case. See also State v. 
McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619 (Ct. App. 2001). 
In the present case, all of the factors support a finding 
that the effect of a lifetime disqualification is so punitive 
that it is transformed into a criminal penalty. 
The revocation of a commercial driver's license can have a 
significant impact on an individual's ability to earn a 
livelihood. Moreover, while a person has a substantial right to 
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operate a motor vehicle and earn a livelihood, regulation of the 
right must be reasonable. See Buell. While a one year COL ban 
may not be disproportionate to the goal of keeping problem 
drivers off the roadways, the permanent ban from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle and maintaining a livelihood is 
disproportionate and unreasonable. Therefore, this action is far 
more punitive in extent and impact than even the suspension of a 
class 0 driver's license. This punitive aspect transforms the 
disqualification into a criminal punishment for the purposes of 
double jeopardy. 
II. IDAHO CODE § 18-8002 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 (2003). A statute may be 
either facially vague in toto or vague "as applied" to a 
particular defendant's conduct. Id. at 712. 
A statute is only void for facial vagueness if it is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Id. at 711-712. 
Therefore, if there is a core set of circumstances to which the 
statute could be unquestionably constitutionally applied, a 
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facial vagueness challenge will fail. State v. Hellickson, 135 
Idaho 742, 745(2001). 
However, while a statute might not be facially vague because 
there is a core set of circumstances to which it does apply, it 
may still be vague as applied to other sets of circumstances. See 
Korsen at 711 712. Mr. Williams is not arguing Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A is facially vague but, rather, that it is vague as 
applied to holders of CDLs such as Mr. Williams. 
Due process requires that a statute defining criminal 
conduct be "worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and 
that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korson at 711. Therefore, 
a statute is void for vagueness if it either "fail[s] to provide 
fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or 
fail[s] to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had 
unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. Id. at 712. 
Although usually applied in the context of criminal 
statutes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies equally well to 
civil ordinances and statutes. See Cowan v. Ed. of Commrs. of 
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, 1259 (2006). 
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"However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil 
or non-criminal statute" under the doctrine. Cowan at 1259-60 
(quoting Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706 (1990)). 
Therefore, in a civil context, a statute is void for vagueness 
"where its language is such that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning," Id. 
It is unclear whether the civil or criminal vagueness 
standard applies to Idaho Code § lS-S002A. In State v. Woolery, 
116 Idaho 36S (19S9), the Court pointed out that Idaho Code 
§ lS-S002 "is devoted entirely to the administrative, or civil, 
suspension of the license of a driver" and "does not in any way 
discuss criminal offenses related to driving under the influence 
of alcohol." Further, Idaho Code § lS-S002(5) states that a 
suspension under lS-S002 or lS-S002A "shall be a civil penalty 
separate and apart from any other" criminal suspension imposed. 
However, while the suspension may be considered a civil 
penalty, the statute as a whole may still be criminal in nature 
for purposes of a vagueness argument. First, Idaho Code 
§ lS-S002A is part of the "Crimes and Punishments" section of the 
Idaho Code. Also, in the preamble to legislation that was 
eventually codified as Idaho Code § lS-S002, the legislature 
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stated that it "has tried to carefully balance the rights of the 
individual who is accused or convicted of wrongdoing against the 
rights of all other citizens." Beem v. State, l19 Idaho 289, 292 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
Further, Idaho Code § 18-8002A provides definitions to be 
used in the entire section, including the definition of "actual 
physical control" as used in § 18-8004. 
Under either the criminal or civil standard, the statute 
fails to pass the vagueness test when applied to individuals with 
commercial driver'S licenses. Therefore, Mr. William's lifetime 
revocation should be vacated. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2) states that, at the time of 
evidentiary testing for driving under the influence, the subject 
shall be informed as follows: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and 
issue a notice of suspension and temporary driving permit to 
you, but no peace officer will issue you a temporary driving 
permit if your driver's license or permit has already been 
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a 
temporary driving permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle 
who refuses to submit to or fails to complete and pass an 
evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) 
days of the notice of suspension of your driver's license to 
show cause why you refused to submit to or to complete and 
pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license 
should not be suspended; 
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(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing 
and do not request a hearing before the court or do not 
prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be 
suspended. The suspension will be for one year if this is 
your first refusal. The suspension will be for two (2) 
years if this is your second refusal within ten (10) years. 
You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted permit 
during that period, and 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing 
and do not request a hearing before the department or do not 
prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be 
suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days 
if this is your first failure of evidentiary testing, but 
you may request restricted noncommercial vehicle driving 
privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The 
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second 
failure of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You 
will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license 
during that period; 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when 
practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests made 
by a person of your own choosing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In addition, Idaho Code § 18-8002A(4) (a) states that upon 
the failure of evidentiary tests: 
[T]he department shall suspend the person's driver's 
license, driver's permit, driving privileges or 
nonresident driving privileges. . for a period of 
ninety (90) days for the first failure of evidentiary 
testing under the provisions of this section. The first 
thirty (30) days of the suspension shall be absolute 
and the person shall have absolutely no driving 
privileges of any kind. Restricted noncommercial 
vehicle driving privileges applicable during the 
remaining sixty (60) days of the suspension may be 
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requested as provided in subsection (9) of this 
section. 
(Emphasis added,) 
Idaho Code § lS-S002A(4) (b) (iv) provides that the notice of 
suspension provided by the department shall state "the procedures 
for obtaining restricted noncommercial vehicle driving 
privileges." 
Finally, Idaho Code § lS-S002A(9) states: 
Restricted noncommercial vehicle driving privileges. A 
person served with a notice of suspension for ninety 
(90) days pursuant to this section may apply to the 
d~partment for restricted noncommercial vehicle driving 
privileges, to become effective after the thirty (30) 
day absolute suspension has been completed. The request 
may be made at any time after service of the notice of 
suspension. . Any person whose driving privileges are 
suspended under the provisions of this chapter may be 
granted privileges to drive a noncommercial vehicle but 
shall not be granted privileges to operate a commercial 
motor vehicle. 
(Emphasis added,) 
The above-quoted portions of Idaho Code § lS-S002A are the 
only portions of the statute that, either by positive reference 
or by negative implication, specify any differences in the 
administrative suspension rules for commercial versus 
noncommercial drivers. 
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In numerous places, the statute speaks generally as to 
"driver's licenses" and "driving privileges," including when it 
discusses suspension time periods. However, in four separate 
places, including in the list of information of which a driver 
must be notified at the time of evidentiary testing, the statute 
specifically points out the difference between commercial and 
noncommercial drivers with regard to the ability of the driver to 
obtain restricted privileges. By doing so, the statute implies 
that the only difference between commercial and non-commercial 
drivers is that a restricted permit is unavailable for commercial 
purposes. By not mentioning any other differences or, at the very 
least, by failing to state that the driver may be subject to a 
separate commercial disqualification under other statutory 
provisions, the statute creates confusion and vagueness with 
regard to commercial drivers. 
"The legislative scheme for suspension of drivers' 
licenses [took] into account the fact that individual drivers 
have rights that must be respected." Beem v. State, 119 Idaho 
289, 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing Idaho Code § 18-8002 
relating to refusals of the evidentiary tests) . Further, the 
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preamble to legislation that was eventually codified as Idaho 
Code § 18-8002 stated, in part, that "the legislature has tried 
to carefully balance the rights of the individual who is accused 
or convicted of wrongdoing against the rights of all other 
citizens." Id. (quoting 1983 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 145, sec. 
1, pp. 368-69). Therefore, the legislature felt it important 
that drivers be advised of the true consequences of refusing 
evidentiary tests, Id. (emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 18-8002A was 
later added providing notification of the consequences of taking 
and failing the evidentiary tests. See also Cunningham v. State, 
150 Idaho 687 (Ct. App. 2011). 
However, neither statute informs drivers of the true 
consequences of refusing or taking and failing evidentiary tests 
because neither advises drivers that there may be additional 
disqualification consequences. By carefully notifying drivers of 
some suspension consequences, but leaving out others, Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A implies that suspension consequences included in the 
statute are the only ones that the driver will face. 
The rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, further supports the argument that Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A is void for vagueness. Under that rule, "where a 
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constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation 
of such things excludes all others." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. 
State Legislature of the State, 142 Idaho 640 (2006). When 
applied to the present situation, that rule of construction would 
indicate that, because Idaho Code § 18-S002A speaks generally of 
"driver's licenses" and "driver's privileges" in relation to the 
suspension time periods and only points out one difference 
between commercial and noncommercial drivers with regard to the 
availability of restricted permits, the logical conclusion is 
that there are no other differences between the two types of 
drivers. 
By carefully providing notification to drivers of some 
suspension consequences for failing an evidentiary test and by 
calling attention to only one difference between commercial and 
non-co~~ercial drivers, Idaho Code § lS-S002A implies that these 
are the only suspension consequences and the only difference 
between commercial and non-commercial drivers. Therefore, the 
stature is vague as applied to Mr. Williams and other commercial 
drivers because it fails to inform commercial drivers of ordinary 
intelligence that they may suffer additional consequences. 
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Further, far beyond having to "guess at its meaning," people 
of common intelligence would reasonably conclude that commercial 
drivers will not suffer any additional consequences than will 
noncommercial drivers other than the inability to obtain a 
restricted permit. 
Mr. Williams was not notified of the consequences of 
submitting to the tests as required by Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A(7) (e). At no time is he informed that his commercial 
driver's license would be disqualified for the rest of his life 
before he took the breath test that resulted in the action taken 
against him in this case. Thus, the statute is vague as applied 
to Mr. Williams. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND 
IN EXCESS OF ITS AUTHORITY BECAUSE THERE IS NO NEXUS 
BETWEEN THE CRIME AND THE PUNISHMENT 
In this case, Mr. Williams was not driving a commercial 
vehicle at either time that he was arrested for driving under the 
influence and failed the breath tests. Nor was Mr. Williams 
using his commercial driver's license at either time that he was 
arrested and failed the breath tests. 
The action by the State of Idaho to disqualify Mr. Williams' 
from using his commercial driver's license for life is a 
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violation of his right to equal protection and substantive due 
process of the law as guaranteed under Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13 
and the 14 Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal because there is no nexus 
between the actions by Mr. Williams and the actions taken by the 
Department. 
In Gibbar supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
In McNeely, this court considered a substantive due process 
challenge to the ALS statute then in effect. Substantive due 
process, as guaranteed by both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions, embodies the requirement that a statute bear a 
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. 
McNeely, 119 Idaho at 189, 804 P.2d at 918; State v. Reed, 107 
Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App. 1984). When 
legislation involves social or economic interests, it may deprive 
a person of life, liberty or property only if it has a rational 
basis-that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so 
inadequate that it may be characterized as arbitrary. Sandpoint 
Convalescent Servs., Inc. V. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 
114 Idaho 281, 282, 756 P.2d 398, 399 (1988); Pace v Hymas, 111 
Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986); McNeely, 119 Idaho at 
189, 804 P. 2d at 918. 
See also State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166 (2005). 
In this case the application of Idaho Code § 49-335 to Mr. 
Williams bears no rational or reasonable relationship to any 
legitimate legislative objective. When the underlying conduct 
does not flow from impairment while driving a commercial motor 
vehicle, a permanent disqualification does not meet the policy of 
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removing impaired driver's from the road. The taking of a 
person's livelihood when the taking bears no relationship to the 
conduct of the person is clearly arbitrary. 
IV. THE LIFETIME REVOCATION IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
AND AN EXCESSIVE FINE 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit the 
imposition of excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. 
The lifetime disqualification of Mr. Williams' commercial 
driver's license in this case is either an excessive fine, cruel 
and unusual punishment, or both. 
In Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 
893 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue of excessive fines as follows: 
The Excessive Fines Clause2 limits the government's power 
to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as 
punishment for an offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d 314, 325 
(1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10, 113 
S.Ct. 2801, 2805, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 497 (1993). Forfeitures 
are payments in kind and, thus, are fines if they constitute 
punishment for an offense, Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328, 118 
S.Ct. At 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d at 325. A civil sanction that 
cannot fairly be said to solely serve a remedial purpose, 
2 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 
CONST. Amend. VIII 
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but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment. Austin, 
509 u.s. at 610, 113 S.Ct. At 2805-06, 125 L.Ed.2d at 498. 
Forfeiture of anything other than an instrumentality of an 
offense is ipso facto punitive and therefore subject to 
Eighth Amendment review, Bajakajian, 524 u.s. at 333 n.8, 
118 S.Ct. at 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d at 328-29; United States v. 
Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 814 (4~h Cir.2000); United States v. 
3814 NW Thurman Street, 164 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9 t t: Cir.1999). 
An instrumentality is the actual means by which an offense 
was committed. Thurman Street, 164 F.3d at 1197. 
Additionally when determining whether a forfeiture is 
subject to the restrictions of the Excessive Fines Clause, 
courts consider whether the forfeiture is punitive in part, 
not limited by the extent of the government's loss, and tied 
to the commission of a crime. See United States v. 
$100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9 th 
Cir.2004); $273,969.04,164 F.3d at 466. The inclusion of an 
innocent-owner defense in a forfeiture statute reveals 
legislative intent to punish those involved in drug 
trafficking Austin, 509 u.S. at 619, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 
L.Ed.2d at 504. 
The lifetime revocation is certainly a forfeiture that not 
only is not "an instrumentality of an offense" but is so 
blatantly excessive because it is at least a partial forfeiture 
of Mr. Williams' right to the pursuit of happiness through his 
choice of employment and career. Furthermore, if viewed as a 
civil sanction, as addressed above, the license revocation only 
serves a retributive and deterrent purpose, thus showing the 
sanction is punishment. 
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Similarly, in Reese, the Court of Appeals went on to 
describe the process of determining what is excessive as follows: 
The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the 
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality-
the amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to 
the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. at 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d 
at 329; United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE/Sport Van, 
VIN # lB4GP44G2YB7884560, 387 F.3d 758, 762 (8 tL Cir.2004). 
"Excessive" means surpassing the usual, the proper, or a 
normal measure of proportion. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335, 
118 S.Ct. at 2037, 141 L.Ed.2d at 330. In Bajakajian, the 
United States Supreme court adopted the gross 
proportionality standard articulated in its Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause opinions for determining whether 
in personam criminal forfeitures are unconstitutionally 
excessive. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. At 
2037-38, 141 L.Ed.2d at 339-31. That standard similarly 
applies to civil in rem forfeitures. United States v. 45 
Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (pt Cir.2004); United States 
v. Wagoner County Real Estate, Rural Route 5, Box, 340, 278 
F.3d 1091,1100 n. 7 (10 th Cir.2002); Ahmad, 213 F.3d at 
815-16 n. 4. Therefore, if the amount of the forfeiture is 
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant's 
offense, it is unconstitutional. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
337, 118 S.Ct. at 2038, 141 L.Ed.2d at 331. 
The inescapable conclusion in this case is that a lifetime 
disqualification is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of 
the offense and bears no relationship to the penalties imposed in 
the criminal case. 
In considering whether a punishment is cruel and unusual 
under both the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho 
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Appellate Courts have identified a similar test to determine 
whether a violation has occurred, i.e., by looking at whether the 
punishment is so out of proportion to the gravity of the offense 
and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people. State 
v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517 (2007); Gibson v. Bennett, 141 
Idaho 270, 275 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The argument regarding a violation of the excessive fines 
provision is equally applicable here. The punishment is so out 
of proportion to the seriousness of this offense (in part because 
there is no nexus between the conduct of Mr. Williams and the 
action taken by the Department) the conscience of reasonable 
people should be shocked that a person who has failed a breath 
test twice while driving on his Class D license should 
automatically and without reservation have his livelihood taken 
by the lifetime disqualification of his commercial driver's 
license. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court in affirming the 
Departments decision to disqualify Mr. Williams for life from 
operating under his commercial driving privileges is 
unconstitutional and illegal. The decision must be reversed. 
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